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A	False	Promise	of	Political	Stability	in	Nepal?
Contrary	to	the	Left	Alliance’s	campaign	pledge,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	new	government	will	deliver	a	new
level	of	political	stability	to	Nepal.	There	are	four	reasons	why,	writes	Julia	Strasheim.	
After	almost	three	months	in	political	limbo,	Nepalis	watched	on	15	February	2018	as	their	26th	prime
minister	in	28	years	was	sworn	into	office.	Owing	to	the	Left	Alliance’s	stunning	victory	in	the	legislative
elections	held	on	26	November	and	7	December	2017,	Khadga	Prasad	Oli	returned	to	the	office	he
briefly	occupied	once	before	in	2015	and	2016.	The	Left	Alliance	is	a	new	political	movement	formed	by	Nepal’s	two
largest	communist	parties:	Oli’s	United	Marxist-Leninists	(UML)	and	the	Maoists,	a	former	rebel	group	led	by	Pushpa
Kamal	Dahal	or	“Prachanda”.	Both	parties	captured	almost	two	thirds	of	parliamentary	seats	in	the	elections,	and
they	agreed	to	formally	merge	into	a	single	communist	party	on	19	February.
In	the	lead	up	to	the	vote,	the	Nepali	Congress	(NC)	–	the	main	political	opponent	of	the	Left	Alliance	–	had	tried	to
stoke	fears	among	the	electorate	by	accusing	the	alliance	of	a	plan	to	impose	a	communist	totalitarian	regime.	But
voters	refused	to	buy	this	allegation,	knowing	that	the	UML	and	the	Maoists	are	communists	by	name	but	not	by
trade.	Voters	also	know	that	the	biggest	threat	to	Nepal’s	democracy	is	not	one	political	movement,	but	the	chronic
instability	and	everlasting	game	of	thrones	between	power-hungry	men	of	various	political	parties.	Their	power
struggles	have	toppled	every	single	government	since	1990:	Most	governments	were	in	power	for	less	than	a	year,
making	far-reaching	political	and	economic	reforms	impossible.
But	contrary	to	the	Left	Alliance’s	campaign	pledge,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	new	government	will	deliver	a	new	level	of
political	stability	to	Nepal.	Here	are	four	reasons	why:
First,	Nepal’s	communist	movement	has	a	notorious	history	of	splits	and	mergers.	A	unified	communist	party	has
existed	once	before:	it	was	formed	in	1949	by	Pushpa	Lal	Shrestha.	But	over	decades,	it	split	into	various	factions.
Splinter	groups	also	broke	away	from	the	Maoist	party	itself	as	recently	as	2012,	2014,	and	2015.	This	factionalism
won’t	stop	now.	Dahal	and	Oli	–	perhaps	the	two	most	ambitious,	charismatic,	and	ego-centric	Nepali	politicians	–
have	been	bitter	rivals	in	the	past.	They	tried	to	briefly	govern	together	in	2015	and	2016,	but	the	Maoists	withdrew
from	the	coalition.	They	accused	Oli	of	failing	to	implement	a	“gentlemen’s	agreement”	and	hand	over	the	post	of
prime	minister	to	Dahal.	When	UML	and	the	Maoists	agreed	to	merge	into	one	party,	Dahal	said	that	a	general
convention	of	the	new	party	will	decide	whether	the	mechanism	of	taking	turns	for	the	prime	minister’s	office	will	be
implemented	again.	This	indicates	that	Dahal	has	no	interest	whatsoever	in	leaving	the	spotlight	to	Oli.
Second,	the	new	government	will	fall	short	on	bringing	stability	because	the	Left	Alliance	was	not	formed	based	on
similar	policy	preferences.	In	fact,	the	UML	and	the	Maoists	until	recently	held	starkly	different	policy	positions
regarding	Nepal’s	most	pressing	security	issue,	the	Madhesi	conflict	in	the	southern	Terai	plains.	Madhesis	are	one
of	several	minority	groups	in	Nepal	who	have	long	protested	the	various	governments	in	Kathmandu	for	failing	to
mitigate	their	profound	discrimination.	The	situation	escalated	in	the	fall	of	2015	when	a	new	constitution	was
promulgated	that	installed	a	federal	political	system	in	Nepal.	Madhesis	held	that	the	system	as	stipulated	by	the
constitution	would	further	marginalise	them,	since	federal	boundaries	were	drawn	in	such	a	way	that	Madhesis	would
become	a	minority	in	all	provinces.	What	they	demanded	instead	was	an	identity-based	version	of	federalism	and	a
Madhes	province.	Until	recently,	this	was	a	policy	the	Maoists	supported,	having	often	played	the	ethnic	card	in
politics	and	having	(successfully)	fought	for	better	representation	of	minorities.	The	UML,	on	the	other	hand,	is	a
stark	opponent	not	only	of	an	identity-federal	model	but	of	ethnic	politics	as	such.	It	is	likely	that	this	policy	divide	will
re-emerge	in	future.
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Protesters	at	a	mass	rally	to	expedite	the	constitution	in	2011.	Photo	credit:	Samsujata,	CC	BY	3.0.
Third,	also	Nepal’s	two-year	old	constitution	is	of	no	avail	to	political	stability,	as	demonstrated	by	the	recent	political
limbo	that	has	followed	the	2017	legislative	elections.	The	new	government	took	almost	three	months	to	form,
amongst	other	things,	because	the	National	Assembly	–	the	upper	house	in	the	bicameral	legislature	–	was	to	be
indirectly	elected	by	the	members	of	the	provincial	assemblies.	But	UML,	NC	and	the	Maoists	could	not	agree	upon
the	mode	of	election.	This	could	have	been	avoided,	had	the	three	parties	–	who	were	the	main	engineers	of	the
constitution	–	agreed	on	procedural	issues	while	drafting	the	constitution	and	not	left	room	for	such	ambiguities.	The
parties	seem	unwilling	to	yet	take	a	clear	stand	on	constitutional	issues,	likely	also	because	future	legal	limbos	could
play	out	to	their	advantage.
Finally,	Nepal’s	neighbours	won’t	make	Oli’s	job	easy.	The	Left	Alliance	won	the	election	on	a	strongly	nationalist	and
anti-India	platform,	presenting	itself	as	the	only	political	force	that	can	stand	up	to	India’s	interfering	in	Nepal’s
internal	affairs.	Many	Nepalis	are	wary	of	India’s	meddling.	Most	recently,	when	Madhesi	activists	set	up	a	blockade
of	the	Nepal–India	border	in	the	fall	of	2015	to	protest	the	constitution,	Oli	openly	accused	India	of	supporting	the
blockade.	This	greatly	bolstered	his	nationalist	credentials	in	the	view	of	the	Nepalese	electorate.	Under	Oli’s	2015-
2016	government,	China	then	began	to	take	on	a	more	prominent	role	as	a	foreign	donor	in	Nepal.	The	Left
Alliance’s	victory	is	thus	also	seen	as	a	foreign	policy	victory	for	China	in	Kathmandu	and	Beijing.	But	alienating	India
–	culturally	and	geographically	the	more	natural	political	partner	for	Nepal	–	cannot	be	Oli’s	winning	strategy	in	the
long	run.	His	difficult	task	will	be	not	only	to	carefully	balance	his	government’s	foreign	policy	in	dealing	with	the	two
regional	powers,	but	to	also	bring	this	policy	in	line	with	the	expectations	of	his	voters.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	posting.
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